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Abstract
Both descriptive and normative arguments claim that the discount rate to be
applied to public projects should be elicited from individual intertemporal
preferences. We present a methodology to analyze data from experimental
surveys on intertemporal preferences. Focusing on the exponential and the
hyperbolic discounting models, we model the experimental data published by
Thaler (1981) by means of different specifications. Standard measures of
goodness of prediction are then applied to fitted data to select among alternative
specifications. We first present our approach by applying it to simulated data.
We then present a procedure for statistical estimation of the sample discount
rate, testing four specifications. The estimation procedure we adopt can be easily
extended to other functional forms, allowing for non-linearity of the valuation
function, inclusion of socio-economic individual characteristics as regressors,
and different specifications for the discounting model.
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2Examining predictive accuracy among discounting models
Evaluation of public projects and policies relies on some
criterion of economic efficiency, either in the form of cost-benefit
analysis, or, when it seems more suitable, of cost efficiency
analysis. Both tests require that the option with higher net value
should be selected. Unfortunately, computation of costs and
benefits is often problematic: one reason is that many public
projects involve costs and benefits that belong to different
outcome domains. This problem is typical of projects that deal
with risks to the environment or public health: for example,
financial benefits may be achieved by incurring environmental
costs, or health benefits are achieved by losses in financial terms.
In these circumstances the usual strategy is to translate all costs
and benefits into a single domain, normally the monetary domain,
so that projects can be effectively compared. Several techniques
are currently available to implement this "translation" procedure:
the most widely used are the hedonic pricing and the contingent
valuation methods. The former can be used when it is possible to
refer to some parallel market prices for the good to be evaluated:
for example, insurance prices for outcomes in the health domain,
or residential housing prices for outcomes in the environmental
domain. When it is not possible to refer to any existing market,
analysts apply the contingent valuation method: it is a procedure
that requires the direct elicitation of the value that individuals
attach to the public good of interest. This procedure is analogous
to the elicitation of preferences used in decision analysis and
experimental economics to investigate the patterns of behavioral
decision making: its reliability rests in large part on the accuracy of
the experimental setting (cfr. Arrow et al., 1993).
Besides the level of costs and benefits, timing of
implementation and duration of the effects of the projects are
another important element of the decision. For example, suppose
that project A and project B give rise to the same costs and
benefits: the only difference is that benefits produced by project A
are available before those produced by project B. Then project A
3would be preferred. Conversely, if, ceteris paribus, costs of project
A are to be borne before the (same amount of) costs of project B,
then project B would be preferred. Even after all costs and
benefits arising from a specific project are expressed in the same
monetary terms, it is still necessary to use another conversion
procedure to reduce cash flows spanning different time periods.
This procedure is called discounting: the way it actually operates
depends on behavioral assumptions that will be explored more
thoroughly in the next section. Here we only observe that the
standard discounting procedure implies application of the same
discount rate, usually the official rate of discount, for different
variable dimensions, for gains or losses, and for the short or the
long run.
The validity of a single discount rate is questioned from a
descriptive point of view. The rationale behind using the official
rate of discount is that, assuming perfect capital markets, everyone
should behave the same way at the margin. Firms and individuals
should borrow and lend until their marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) between present and future consumption is equal to the
interest rate. If a consumer failed to act as the theory predicts,
there would be some way to rearrange his consumption plan to
make him better off. For example, if his MRS is higher than the
interest rate, the individual would find it attractive to trade some
future consumption with present consumption– while the opposite
holds if his MRS is lower. So, the market interest rate should
reflect perfectly the intertemporal preferences of individuals. Yet,
as pointed out by Lind (1990), we can observe that individuals
trade at very different interest rates: for example, people may at the
same time save at some interest rate, and charge consumption on
credit cards at a much higher interest rate. The reason may not just
be a matter of transaction costs (easy access to one's own funds is
obviously the basic motivation for using credit cards) which
invalidate the assumption of perfect capital markets, but it can also
depend on the individuals’ desire to maintain separate budgets, as a
means of control on their spending. A typical example may be the
limited amount that people may decide to carry with them when
4going to the horse races. If “people adopt rules and divide assets
into separate budgets to facilitate actions that require self-control,
then it also follows that individuals do not necessarily change
levels of present and future consumption to equalize their marginal
rates of substitution with the marginal rate (i.e., the interest rate) at
which they can transform present into future income”(Lind, cit., p.
S20). “Therefore, market rates that determine consumers’ potential
rates of transformation may tell us nothing about people’s rates of
time preference” (ibidem). Lind suggests use of the consumer's rate
of time preference, that may be context dependent, rather than use
of the official rate of discount in the capital market. This position
is also supported by Arrow et al. (1996), who argue that discount
rates should be based on how individuals trade off present to
future consumption, and admit that discount rates can change with
the time horizon to reflect the judgement and behavior of
individuals. Given uncertainties in identifying the correct rate of
discount, they also suggest that it is appropriate to use a range of
discount rates, and that this range should be applied to all analyses
on (similar) public projects. Just as present preferences for non-
market goods are elicited with experimental methods, the same can
be done for intertemporal preferences: so again, experimental
methods may help to define a range of discount rates in the
relevant setting.
Furthermore, application of the discounting technique to
projects that produce effects in non-monetary domains has led
some authors to claim even a normative shortcoming of the
standard discounting procedure, when public projects have a high
impact on health or the environment. According to this view,
discounting should depend on the problem that is being analyzed:
different circumstances would require not only different discount
rates, but also different procedures. For example, the standard
discounting technique implies that flows in the distant future are
so heavily discounted that even huge amounts result in a negligible
discounted present value. This would unduly penalize (promote)
those projects that present extremely high benefits (costs) that are
delayed into the distant future. Descriptive experiments have
5shown differing temporal preferences across monetary and non-
monetary domains of health (Chapman, 1996), and air and ocean
shore water quality ( Guyse, Keller, and Eppel, 1999), and for
different time horizons for protective investments ( Kunreuther et
al. 1998). These descriptive findings and the normative argument
against a single discount rate have led to the proposition of
alternative discounting models, that will be briefly reviewed in
section 1.
In section 2 we present a methodology to analyze data from
experimental surveys on intertemporal preferences. Using a
published dataset, we examine exponential and hyperbolic
discounting models fit exactly to different certainty equivalent
judgments from aggregated data. Section 3 contains measures for
selecting the best performing model. In section 4 we generate a
simulated dataset generated from the discount rates elicited by
applying the exponential and hyperbolic models in section 2. In
section 5 we examine the predictive accuracy of the models for the
simulation dataset. In section 6 we test different econometric
specifications to estimate the sample discount rate, and select the
model with best predictive accuracy. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
1. Discounting models
Most discounting models are based on the behavioral
assumption that people prefer to experience pleasurable
experiences as soon as possible, and to delay painful experiences.
While the first hypothesis, impatience, seems fairly robust to
empirical observation and experimental tests, the second one,
procrastination of pain, is more controversial. In fact, it can often
be observed that people may prefer to get rid sooner of some
unpleasant experience, rather than wait (it may be argued that in so
doing, they are avoiding the unpleasant experience of anticipating
the future unpleasant experience.)
We will see in the following that different sets of behavioral
assumptions generate different types of discounting models. We
will refer to the general approach taken by Fishburn and
6Rubinstein (1982) in examining the effect of the time of realization
of an outcome to the relative desirability of the outcome. They
study the implications of various axioms for a (weak) preference
relation. They start from a simple axiomatic structure: given a non-
degenerate real interval X (the set of outcomes); and either a set T
of successive non-negative integers, or an interval T of non-
negative numbers (the set of time points), consider the topological
space X´T (the dimensions of outcomes and time). Consider the
axioms:
A1.  ³ is a weak order on X´T;
A2. If x > y then (x, t) > (y, t);
A3. {(x, t): (x, t) ³ (y, s)}, and {(x, t): (x, t) £ (y, s)}
are closed in the product topology on X´T.
A4:If s < t then x > 0 ® (x, s) > (x, t); x = 0 ® (x, s) ~ (x, t);
x < 0 ® (x, s) < (x, t).
The first three axioms ensure continuity, monotonicity, and
ordering of outcomes in the space X´T; the fourth is the
behavioral assumption of impatience for positive outcomes, and
procrastination for negative outcomes. Fishburn and Rubinstein
show that this axiomatic structure implies the existence of a real
valued function u on X´T that is monotonic in x and t;
continuous, and increasing in x; continuous in t if t is continuous;
decreasing (constant, increasing) in t if x is greater (equal, less) than
zero.
Fishburn and Rubinstein do not present a specific functional
form associated with the general set of axioms A1-A4. A
representation function is instead provided when an axiom of
stationarity is added to the previous set of axioms:
A5. If (x, t) R (y, t+d) then (x, s) R (y, s+d).
The model implied by this axiomatic structure assumes the form
7E1. a t f(x),
known as the exponential discounting model when ¦ is linear on x.
So receiving $10 with a t-period delay would be equivalent to
(1/1+d)t $10 today, where d  is the discount rate.The function f
need not necessarily be linear, though. Fishburn and Rubinstein
show that the representation holds with f concave as well, as when
f is a risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
Relaxing the axiom of stationarity, and substituting it with a
weaker axiom of separability (Thomsen condition), Fishburn and
Rubinstein obtain another functional form, that still allows one to
separate the effect of time preference from outcome preference:
E2. r(t) f(x),
with r, the preference functional over time, continuous,
positive and decreasing in t; and f, the preference functional over
outcomes, continuous and increasing in x, with f(0)=0. This
formulation allows the functional form for costs to be different
from that for benefits.
This representation is compatible with the market segmentation
approach (cfr. Benzion et al., 1989), that assumes different
discount rates for different types of moves from some equilibrium
position. In this approach discounting depends not only on the
sign of the monetary amount (i.e., a payment or a receipt), but also
on the sign of the temporal movement (i.e. an anticipation or a
postponement of the cost or the benefit). This gives four different
discount rates depending on four possible changes from the
equilibrium position. The market segmentation hypothesis is
empirically supported by observation of discrepancies between
borrowing and lending rates, and can be modeled by means of a
concave utility function. It is also consistent with the Anticipated
Discount model introduced by Loewenstein (1987), that
substitutes a Prospect Theory (cfr. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
type of utility function for the standard von Neumann-
8Morgenstern function in the discounting model; we will describe
this model later.
In the market segmentation approach the discount rate is
dependent on the direction of the movement (gain or loss,
anticipation or delay), but the absolute level of the variation is
assumed not to affect discounting. This assumption is dropped in
another approach, defined by Benzion et al. as the Added
Compensation approach, that allows the discount rate to vary with
both the sign and the actual level of the change from the
equilibrium position.
The Fishburn and Rubinstein model with the Thomsen condition
holds in the continuous time setting, but it does not hold in a
discrete time setting without invoking a more complex set of
axioms.  Another approach is to adopt another separability axiom,
that can be defined as a utility independence condition:
A6.If (x, s) R (y, s), then (x, t) R (y, t).
According to this assumption, preferences over outcomes are
independent of preferences over time periods. It can be considered
as an intertemporal consistency axiom.
A stronger independence axiom, proposed by Harvey (1986), is
the stretching axiom: it states that the ordering of outcomes in two
periods depends on the relative difference (the ratio) between two
periods.
A7. If (x, s) R (y, t), then (x, d×s) R (y, d×t).
The set of axioms A1-A4 plus the axiom A7 supports the
following representation, known as the hyperbolic model:
E3. [1/(1+t) g ] f(x),
where g >0 is a parameter that represents individuals'
intertemporal preferences. The hyperbolic model was first
9axiomatized by Harvey (1986) to provide a solution to the problem
of the excessive discounting of distant future flows implied by the
exponential discounting model.
2. Test of the models
We now present a methodology to analyze experimental data
from surveys on intertemporal preferences. Since this
demonstration is to be considered as illustrative of the method, we
chose to apply it to the dataset published by Thaler (1981).
The standard approach used in decision theory to analyze this
type of data has been to apply some statistical test (usually non-
parametric, but also some parametric models have been applied,
see Benzion et al. (1989) to test the validity of specific assumptions
of different models). The approach we will use here instead is
more general, in that it considers different models as estimators of
the data drawn from the elicitation procedure of the experiment.
In the review presented in the preceding section we have examined
two main discounting models: the exponential model and the
hyperbolic model. In the present application we analyze the
performance of these two models, assuming f (x) is linear in the
monetary outcome.
There are different procedures to elicit individuals'
intertemporal preferences. A choice procedure requires the
decision maker to choose between an amount to be received (or
paid) now, and another specified amount to be received (paid)
some specified time later. Another procedure, called the matching
method, requires the individual to assess the amount that would
make her indifferent between getting some given amount now, and
getting that amount at some specified later time period. Drawing
from results in the contingent valuation literature, we can infer that
the former procedure is the easiest for the respondent, but it is
also less informative. While the matching method produces precise
data points, the choice method only generates dichotomous
ordering type of data, and requires more observations for an
efficient statistical analysis.
Also, the amounts may be stocks, to be received or paid at a
point in time, or flows, to be received or paid along a time stream.
10
The latter setting has been analyzed by Loewenstein and Prelec
(1993), who argue that preferences over sequences of outcomes
may also be affected by the distribution of the outcomes along the
time dimension, in addition to the absolute level of the amounts to
be received or paid. A descriptively valid analysis of preferences
over sequences of outcomes would require more complex
behavioral assumptions than those we considered in the preceding
section. To simplify the analysis, in this paper we only consider
intertemporal preferences over stocks, rather than flows of
outcomes.
The data published by Thaler (1981) are medians of amounts
elicited using the matching method: therefore, we have data point
observations, that we can use for our illustrative purpose. We have
four subsamples, each of them was presented with a given amount
now to be matched with some amount in three months, one year,
and three years for a total of nine matching points for each
subsample. The dataset is represented in Table 1: the left column
contains the M0 present amounts proposed to each subsample.
The other columns contain the (median) amounts expressed by
respondents when asked the outcome Mt that would have made
them indifferent between getting a given M0 now, or  getting Mt
later. For example, scenario A required subjects to consider
amounts to be gained now and state an indifferent amount to be
received in three months (M3), one year (M12), and three years
(M36), respectively. The first three subsamples were presented
with gains, i.e., amounts to be received, now or later; the last group
was instead presented with a loss, i.e., a payment to be sustained
now or later.
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Table 1. Median Amounts Matching Monetary Gain/Loss
M0 Now with Delayed Amount Mt (from Thaler, 1981)
Amount Now,
M0
Matching Amount, Mt, Delayed by t
Months
Scenario A Now 3 Months 12 Months 36 Months
(gains) 15 30 60 100
250 300 350 500
3000 3500 4000 6000
Scenario B Now 6 Months 12 Months 60 Months
(gains) 75 100 200 500
250 300 500 1000
1200 1500 2400 5000
Scenario C Now 1 Month 12 Months 120 Months
(gains) 15 20 50 100
250 300 400 1000
3000 3100 4000 10000
Scenario D Now 3 Months 12 Months 36 Months
(losses) -15 -16 -20 -28
-100 -102 -118 -155
-250 -251 -270 -310
If the individual is indifferent between M0 and Mt, the
discounted present value of Mt must be equal to M0. Assuming that
a particular model (exponential or hyperbolic) holds, it is then
possible to calculate the implicit discount rate. For example, if
individuals are indifferent between $15 now and $30 in three
months, the implicit monthly rate of discount for the exponential
model is the d that solves the following equation:
$15 = $30/(1+d)3,
i.e., d = 0.260.
The implicit discount rate for the hyperbolic model is instead
the g that solves the following equation:
$15 = $30/(1+3)g,
i.e., g = 0.500.
Thaler observed that the implicit monthly discount rates
calculated from the exponential discounting model from the
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elicited matching values present a pattern far from uniform:
generally they decrease as the time length and the amount levels
increase. When instead the hyperbolic discounting model is applied
to the same data, we do not observe a clear pattern. Table 2 shows
the implicit (monthly) discount rates inferred from each model:
Table 2A. Implicit (Monthly) Discount Rates d from
Thaler's Data (Exponential)
0
Month\s
1
Month
3
Months
6
Months
12
Months
36
Months
60
Months
120
Months
Scenario A
Gains
$250
$3000
.260
.122
.054
.063
.028
.019
.053
.024
.019
Scenario B
Gains
$75
$250
$1200
.101
.085
.032
.063
.059
.023
.077
.059
.024
Scenario C
Gains
$15
$250
$3000
.101
.106
.016
.063
.040
.012
.011
.024
.010
Scenario D
Losses
-$15
-$100
-$250
.022
.024
.017
.007
.014
.012
.001
.006
.006
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Table 2B. Implicit (Monthly) Discount Rates g  from
Thaler's Data (Hyperbolic)
0
Mont
hs
1
Month
3
Months
6
Months
12
Months
36
Months
60
Months
120
Months
Scenario A
Gains
$15
$250
$3000
.500
.540
.525
.132
.131
.192
.111
.112
.192
Scenario B
Gains
$75
$250
$1200
.148
.382
.461
.094
.270
.337
.115
.270
.347
Scenario C
Gains
$15
$250
$3000
.415
.469
.396
.263
.183
.289
.047
.112
.251
Scenario D
Losses
-$15
-$100
-$250
.047
.112
.173
.014
.065
.121
.003
.030
.060
A quick look at the implicit rates of discount reported in Tables
2A and 2B would lead us to think that the hypothesis of a unique
discount rate, to be applied to all projects, independently of their
time horizon, and the level of the outcomes involved, should be
rejected. This is in fact the conclusion reported by Thaler. A
number of techniques for statistical analysis can be used to test the
hypothesis in a more rigorous manner. A standard practice is to
apply an analysis of variance to the implicit discount rates.
The method we propose here is to test if the values obtained
from a particular model are a good predictor of the actual values.
We want to test the hypothesis that the discount rate is
independent of the time horizon and the outcome levels of the
project. If the values obtained by applying some constant discount
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rate to the present values M0 (by using that rate as if compounding
interest over time on the base amount M0) can be considered an
acceptable prediction of the actual values Mt , the hypothesis can
be accepted. If a constant discount rate yields an acceptable model,
then this parameter value could be used in practical settings for
guiding decision making or describing people’s preferences.
In the following, we first show an application to simulated data,
and then we will apply the method to values obtained through
Maximum Likelihood estimation. In the simulation exercise, we
multiply the 36 values M0 by the implicit discount rates obtained
from the elicited matching values: we obtain 36 vectors of
simulated matching values, "predicted" by a specific discounting
model (exponential or hyperbolic) given a specific constant
discount rate. The model that gives the best prediction would be
selected. Of course, best prediction does not mean good
prediction: it may well be that even the best is so bad that we will
anyway wish to reject the hypothesis of a constant rate of discount,
at least under the exponential or the hyperbolic model, i.e., the two
discounting models under analysis. Nevertheless, in practice, it
may be necessary to specify a constant discount rate for analysis
due to regulatory or administrative requirements, which our
method will do. In the next section we will briefly describe the
statistical criteria we will apply in our analysis.
3. Model selection
A commonly used criterion for goodness of prediction is the
Mean Square Error:
2
1
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i.e., the average of the squared differences between predicted
and actual values, or its root, which is often preferred because its
value level is the same as that of the data. The model that
minimizes this measure can be considered as the best predictor,
and different models can be ranked according to this measure.
However, it may also be useful to indicate if the prediction is good
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or bad in absolute terms. For this purpose, Theil (1966) suggested
the U-statistic defined as:
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This measure is zero for perfect predictions, and values close to
zero can be considered as good predictors; however, it does not
have an upper bound. Another measure, previously suggested by
Theil, is the following:
åå +
=
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U
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It is well known (cfr. Maddala, cit., p. 346) that this measure
may not give a correct ranking of the models; the problem is that,
as also pointed out by Theil (1966), the coefficient is not uniquely
determined by the MSE. However, it has the virtue of producing
an index ranging in the bounded interval [0,1], where values close
to one indicate worse predictors, and values close to zero better
predictors. This feature makes the comparison of estimators easier,
and we will therefore employ also this measure in our analysis, in
addition to the other two.
The mean square error, and the other related measures
described above, account for all deviations of the predicted values
from the actual values. It can be useful to analyze more thoroughly
the nature of these deviations. As suggested by Theil (1966) the
MSE can be decomposed into three parts:
=
-
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The first two measures indicate a systematic error in the
prediction, while the last measure indicates a disturbance. As an
alternative to the criterion of minimization of the whole MSE, the
analyst may decide to adopt the criterion of minimization of the
systematic error: both UM and UR tend to zero for the optimal
predictor (cfr. Maddala (1977, p.345)).
An alternative measure is to consider the correlation coefficient
r between predicted and actual values. As pointed out by Maddala
(cit.), the disadvantage of this measure is that it does not penalize
the predictor for systematic linear bias: so, for example, a model
that always underpredicts actual values by 50%, receives a perfect
score. However, if we combine the two criteria of maximizing the
correlation and minimizing the systematic error in a sort of
multicriteria analysis framework, we may overcome this problem.
We will carry out this test too, and compare the results obtained
with the other tests based on the minimization of MSE criterion.
Finally, it is also often recommended in the literature that the
evaluation of models should be always supported by the analysis of
the plots of the prediction error series. This analysis will serve as a
“tie breaker” if the two classes of criteria described above were to
give different results.
4. The simulation procedure
We generate a new dataset from the discount rates elicited by
applying the exponential and the hyperbolic model to the data.
The procedure consists of applying each rate of discount in Tables
2A and 2B to the whole series of 36 proposed Mt values which
match present amounts M0: this produces a vector of 36 elements
of simulated matching values for each of the 36 discount rates.
The set of simulated data for each model is therefore a 36´36
matrix. Tables 3A and 3B report the mean and standard deviation
of the simulated values produced by each model. For example, in
the upper left-hand corner of Table 3A, Thaler’s subjects gave an
actual median response of $30 for a three month delay to match
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$15 now. When the 36 discount rates d from Table 2A are each
used to predict the actual amount, by the exponential formula:
$15 = ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
+ d1
1 3 prediction,
the mean prediction was $18 and the standard deviation was $4.
These measures are obviously too rough to provide an indication
of the goodness of either model: the statistics refer to the data
generated through a wide range of discount rates, and even a
perfect prediction with one of the discount rates would be
unrevealed by these data. Yet, it is worth observing that the
hyperbolic model gives on average simulated values closer to the
real ones, and especially that it avoids the problem of "explosive"
results obtained by the exponential model, especially when the
procedure involves long time periods.
Table 3A. Mean and Standard Deviation of Simulated Amounts: Exponential Model
Now Actual Values and Mean and Standard Deviation of Predicted Values
3 Months 12 Months 36 MonthsScenario A
Gains actual predicted actual predicted actual predicted
15 30 18 (4)a 60 45 (84) 100 15201 (78975)
250 300 297 (71) 350 755 (1401) 500 253357 (1316250)
300 3500 3559 (855) 4000 9066
(16818)
6000 3040292
(1579499)
6 Months 12 Months 60 MonthsScenario B
Gains actual predicted actual predicted actual predicted
 75 100 111 (69) 200 227 (420) 500 67631271
(®+¥b)
250 300 372 (229) 500 755 (1401) 1000 ®+¥ (®+¥)
1200 1500 1783 (1098) 2400 3626 (6727) 5000 ®+¥ (®+¥)
1 Month 12 Months 120 MonthsScenario C
Gains actual predicted actual predicted actual predicted
 15 20 16 (1) 50 45 (84) 100 ®+¥ (®+¥)
250 300 263 (18) 400 755 (1401) 1000 ®+¥ (®+¥)
3000 3100 3161 (215) 4000 9066
(16818)
10000 ®+¥ (®+¥)
3 Months 12 Months 36 MonthsScenario D
Losses actual predicted actual predicted actual predicted
 -$15 -16 -18 (4) -20 -45 (84) -28 -15201 (78975)
-$100 -102 -118 (28) -118 -302 (560) -155 -101343 (526500)
-$250 --251 -297 (71) -270 -755 (1401) -310 -253358 (131250)
aValues in parentheses are standard deviations.
bValues greater than 107 are indicated as approaching infinity.
Table 3B. Mean and Standard Deviation of Simulated Amounts: Hyperbolic Model
Actual Values and Mean and Standard Deviation of Predicted Values
3 Months 12 Months 36 MonthsScenario A
Gains actual predicted actual predicted actual predicted
30 21 (5)a 60 29 (13) 100 39 (25)
300 347 (81) 350 478 (214) 500 656 (425)
3500 4169 (969) 4000 5740 (2571) 6000 7873 (5094)
6 Months 12 Months 60 MonthsScenario B
Gains actual predicted actual predicted actual predicted
100 120 (40) 200 144 (64) 500 231 (172)
300 402 (134) 500 478 (214) 1000 771 (573)
1500 1932 (644) 2400 2296 (1029) 5000 3701 (2751)
1 Month 12 Months 120 MonthsScenario C
Gains actual predicted actual predicted actual predicted
20 18 (2) 50 29 (13) 100 58 (51)
300 293 (33) 400 478 (214) 1000 972 (851)
3100 3515 (398) 4000 5740 (2571) 10000 11670 (10206)
3 Months 12 Months 36 MonthsScenario D
Losses actual predicted actual predicted actual predicted
-16 -21 (5) -20 -29 (13) -28 -39 (25)
-102 -138 (32) -118 -191 (86) -155 -262 (170)
--251 -347 (81) -270 -478 (214) -310 -656 (425)
aValues in parentheses are standard deviations.
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5. Predictive accuracy of models for the simulated dataset
The hypothesis to be tested is that there exists a unique
discounting model (i.e., a specific mathematical discounting
procedure applied to a specific discount rate) that can predict
reasonably well the data. To test the goodness of fit, or prediction,
of the model, we apply the MSE criterion, and the related indexes
U and Ub described in section 3; for all these measures lower
values are better. In addition, we will consider the component UD
to measure the disturbance or non-systematic term
(complementary of UM+UR to unity), and the correlation between
predicted and actual values. For these alternative criteria, higher
values are better for the best predictor. Tables 4A and 4B report
some summary statistics on the tests respectively performed on the
36 exponential specifications and the 36 hyperbolic specifications.
Cells shaded in the minimum column are for measures which are
better when low, cells shaded in the maximum column are for
measures which are better when high.
Table 4A: Summary Statistics on Tests: Exponential Model
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
Mean Square Error MSE 617.454 ®+¥a ®+¥ ®+¥
U-Statistic 0.246 ®+¥ ®+¥ ®+¥
Bounded Ub 0.132 1 0.667 0.327
Bias Proportion UM 0.002 0.196 0.052 0.056
Regression Proportion UR 0.042 0.968 0.797 0.282
Disturbance Proportion UD ®0b 0.876 0.150 0.249
Correlation r 0.675 0.971 0.795 0.189
aValues greater than 107 are indicated as approaching infinity.
bValues less than 10-7 are indicated as approaching zero.
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Table 4B: Summary Statistics on Tests: Hyperbolic Model
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
Mean Square Error MSE 585.082 6153.078 1659.3681425.227
U-Statistic 0.233 2.453 0.661 0.568
Bounded Ub 0.111 0.560 0.273 0.121
Bias Proportion UM 0.026 0.153 0.111 0.037
Regression Proportion UR 0.041 0.860 0.424 0.279
Disturbance Proportion UD 0.009 0.923 0.465 0.299
Correlation r 0.867 0.984 0.946 0.034
It is quite clear from these data that in general the hyperbolic
model outperforms the exponential: the statistics for all measures,
with the exception of the UM test, are better for the hyperbolic
model. It can also be observed that the exponential model is much
riskier than the hyperbolic model: applying incorrectly the
exponential model may produce very bad results, as testified by the
extreme values reached by some of the measures.
However, one particular exponential specification might turn
out to fit the data better. We therefore proceed to select the
optimal specifications for each model according to the two criteria
defined in section 3:
minimization of the MSE, or one of the related indexes; or
minimization of systematic bias combined  with maximization of
correlation between predicted and actual values.
Minimization of the systematic bias, i.e. the components
UM+UR, is equivalent to maximization of the complementary value
UD. Therefore we now consider this value only. In addition, for
the satisfaction of the second criterion, we should consider the
correlation coefficient. For the minimization of the MSE we
consider now the U-test. The best values for these three tests are
reported in Table 5, referring to five specifications: two of them
are specifications of the exponential model, and the other three are
specifications of the hyperbolic model. The rates of discount
producing these different specifications are also reported in Table
5.
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Table 5: Tests on Selected Specifications
Model
Specification
Discount
 Rates
U-
Statistic
Disturbance
Proportion UD
Correlation
r
E1 d = 0.010 0.246 0.731 0.971
E2 d = 0.012 0.263 0.876 0.961
H1 g = 0.192 0.255 0.923 0.961
H2 g = 0.251 0.233 0.712 0.975
H3 g = 0.347 0.605 0.068 0.984
If the decision rule adopted is a), the hyperbolic discounting
model specification H2 (with discount rate ã = 0.251) should be
selected, since its U measure is the lowest. If instead the criterion
b) is adopted, the ranking is not so straightforward. The hyperbolic
model specification H3 has the highest correlation coefficient;
however, the bad score in the other two tests suggests that the
model is affected by a serious systematic bias problem, and we can
safely reject it. The choice over the other specifications is more
problematic, since there is not a clear pattern. The hyperbolic
model specification H1 (with ã = 0.192) might be preferred,
because it is considerably better than the others in terms of
absence of systematic bias, while it is just a little bit worse than the
other with respect to the correlation measure; however, other
rankings may be justifiable as well.
Our method shows how to find the discounting model which
best fits the data, without explicitly assuming error in a person’s
judgments. We consider error in the next section.
6. Estimation of discount rates assuming an error term
Analogously to the experimental procedures to assess non-
market values, that involve the estimation of the sample valuation
from elicited individual values (which may be distorted due to
judgment errors), a sample discount rate could be estimated from
the elicited individual rates. In order to obtain a (parametric)
estimate of the discount rate from our sample observations, we
should first specify a statistical model with an error term. For each
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given value M0, we assume that the matching value Mt is
functionally related to M0 according to the model:
e××= tMfM 0 .
Apart from specifying a multiplicative error term, the model
above is still very general, since both the functional form ¦ and the
distributive properties of the error term are implicit. When
individual socio-economic characteristics are available, the
functional form ¦ may be specified in order to include these
characteristics as explanatory variables. In our example we do not
include any regressors in the model; furthermore, we maintain the
usual assumption of linearity of the valuation function, that can be
easily relaxed just by applying an appropriate transformation to the
amounts M. We will make two hypotheses on the functional form
of the discounting model, specifying the function in terms of the
exponential model or the hyperbolic model. Two alternative
hypotheses will be tested also for the error term: a) the distribution
of the error term is Normal, with mean zero and variance s2; b) the
distribution of the error term is Log-normal, so that ln(e) is Normal,
with mean zero and variance s2. These hypotheses give rise to four
different specifications:
e
d
×
+
=
t
tMM
)1(0
, that can be also expressed as:
eq ××= ttMM 0  (exponential normal specification).   (1)
If the error term in (1) is Normal, the model is non-linear; if the
error term is Log-normal, the model can be linearized through a
transformation:
ed ln)1ln(ln
0
++×= t
M
M t , that can also be expressed as.
eq lnln
0
+×= t
M
M t  (exponential log-normal specification).   (2)
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If the discounting model to be applied is the hyperbolic, the
specification is:
e
g
×
+
=
)1(0 t
M
M t , that can also be expressed as:
e
q
×
+
=
)1(
10
tM
M
t
 (hyperbolic normal specification). (3)
If the error term is Normal, the model is non-linear; if it is Log-
normal, the model can be transformed into a linear one:
eq ln)1ln(ln
0
++×= t
M
M t
(hyperboliclog-normal Specification). (4)
All models will be estimated through Maximum Likelihood
procedures, according to the general specification:
[ ]2
2
)(
2
1
ln2ln
2
å ----= q
s
sp hyn
n
il ,
where the values inside the brackets are the dependent and
independent variables, that depend on the specification selected.
The parameter estimates and log-likelihood for the four models are
shown in the following table:
Table 6: Log-Likelihoods and Parameter Estimates
Exponential
Normal
Exponential
Log-normal
Hyperbolic
Normal
Hyperbolic
Log-normal
l 6.527 -24.616 8.671 -19.238
q 0.9737
(0.0043)a
0.0169
(0.0019)
0.2059
(0.0212)
0.2597
(0.0238)
s 0.2018
(0.0238)
0.4794
(0.0565)
0.1902
(0.0224)
0.4129
(0.0487)
aValues in parentheses are standard errors
The discount rates for each model are obtained after the
appropriate transformation of the estimated parameter theta: e.g.,
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for the Normal exponential model, 1
1
-=
q
d ; for the Log-normal
exponential model, 1))(exp( -= qd ; while for the hyperbolic
model, g º q, i.e. the estimated parameter is exactly the hyperbolic
discount rate.
Table 7: Tests on Estimated Specifications
Model
Specification
Discount
 Rates
U-
Statistic
Disturbance
Proportion UD
Correlation
r
EN d = 0.027 4.316 0.017 0.779
EL d = 0.017 0.876 0.205 0.894
HN g = 0.206 0.235 0.979 0.965
HL g = 0.256 0.248 0.594 0.976
It is quite clear from the statistics reported in Table 7 that the
hyperbolic model dominates the exponential. The ranking between
the two specifications of the hyperbolic model is not so well
defined, but the hyperbolic normal has both a better U-Statistic and
a lower systematic error than the hyperbolic log-normal
specification. Indeed, the hyperbolic normal model seems to
perform quite well: the values obtained with either criterion
support the hypothesis that the elicited values are generated by a
unique discount rate and the differences in elicited values are due
to a multiplicative error term which follows a Normal distribution.
The intertemporal preferences of Thaler’s sample are then
characterized by the hyperbolic discount rate g = 0.206.
7. Conclusions
A method for characterizing intertemporal preferences by
selecting the discounting model which best fits data on  people’s
preferences is presented. Such an approach can be useful when
analyzing experimental data or in policy making when a
discounting model to characterize residents’ temporal discounting
preferences is needed. Standard measures of goodness of
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prediction are applied to fitted data to select among alternative
specifications of discounting models. We limited our analysis to
the exponential and the hyperbolic discounting models. We first
presented our approach by applying it to simulated data, that we
obtain by manipulating a matrix of experimental data on
intertemporal preferences published by Thaler (1981). We then
proceeded to estimate the sample discount rate, testing four
different specifications: exponential or hyperbolic discount
models, modeled with a Normal or log-Normal distribution of the
error term. We found that the hyperbolic discounting model with a
Normal error term applied multiplicatively provided the best fit.
Furthermore, in contrast to Thaler’s conclusions, we found that its
predictive accuracy is good enough to warrant acceptance of the
hypothesis that the data are expressed by a unique discount rate:
i.e. the hyperbolic discount rate g = 0.206. As Camerer (1998)
notes, the economics profession has been slow to accept the
hyperbolic discounting model. Our method provides an approach
for determinining when it is most appropriate.
The estimation procedure we adopted can be easily extended to
other functional forms, allowing for non-linearity of the valuation
function, socio-economic individual characteristics included as
regressors, and different specifications for the discounting model.
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